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This paper analyses wage dynamics at individual level using the
ECHP data. We compare yearly wage changes of employees in twelve
European countries during the 1994-96 time-period. In all the Euro-
pean countries we …nd evidence of nominal and not real wage rigidity.
At the same time, in none of the countries considered wages are com-
pletely downwardly rigid. We also compare nominal wage changes of
employees staying with the same employer to movers and …nd that,
despite movers distributions are generally more ‡exible than stayers,
surprisingly enough they also have a spike at zero. Explanations of
the above results with institutional features of the countries considered
are given.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The interest in analyzing individual panel data in order to assess whether
wages are rigid or ‡exible dates back to McLaughlin (1994)’s paper. From
that date on, a number of analyses have been carried out both for the US
and some European Countries. There is no agreement among researchers
about the extent of downward wage rigidity even for the US, where most of
the analyses have been carried out using the same data-set, the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics (PSID). Intercountry comparisons are di¢cult because
surveys are carried out in di¤erent ways, and therefore the information avail-
able both for de…ning the subsample and the variable of interest may di¤er
across countries. In this paper we overcome this problem, at least for compar-
isons across 12 European countries (UK, Italy, France, Germany, Denmark,
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal), by
using the …rst 3 waves of the recent European Community Household Panel
(ECHP), for the period 1994-1996. The relevant feature of this data-set is
that the same questionnaire is asked across the countries involved in the
survey. This obviously enormously simpli…es intercountry-comparisons.
The analysis of wage changes distributions is particularly interesting for
di¤erent reasons. First of all, it allows us to test if wages are downwardly
rigid, and therefore to determine the extent of wage rigidity. At the same
time, looking at wage dynamics we can easily check if we observe nominal or
real wage rigidity at individual level. Apart from helping us to understand the
nature of unemployment (Keynesian if nominal wages are predetermined or
classical if real wages are …xed), and therefore the appropriate measures to be
adopted to try to reduce it, assessing whether wages are rigid in nominal or in
real terms is an easy way of testing the implications of microeconomic theories
that explain how wage dynamics are determined. In the literature some
theories (menu costs, staggered contracts, theories where there is imperfect
information on wages, Keynes’s relative wage theory) predict nominal wage
rigidity, others (implicit contracts, e¢ciency wage, insider-outsider theories)
imply real wage rigidity, whereas others (McLeod and Malcomson’s hold-
up models) can at least in theory give rise to both1. Therefore, evidence on
percentage wage changes at individual level are crucial in order to understand
which of the above theories gives plausible explanations for the stylised facts
observed in the data.
1They show that, if indexing wages is costly, their model implies nominal wage rigidity
2The existing evidence on wage changes seems to support the idea that
wages are rigid in nominal, and not in real terms. At the same time, wage
cuts do not seem to be rare. Using data from the PSID, McLaughlin (1994)
…nds that on average over 1976-86 there were 17% stayers experiencing wage
cuts and 7% had zero nominal pay growth. He uses two measures for wages:
earnings and hourly earnings concluding that wages in the US are quite ‡exi-
ble. Instead of pooling together periods of high and low in‡ation, subsequent
studies have focused on yearly wage changes, …nding evidence of a spike at
zero for nominal wage changes distributions. This spike is taken as evidence
of nominal wage rigidity. But, although being quite asymmetric around
zero, wage changes distributions are not completely downwardly rigid. Kahn
(1997) distinguishes between 10.6% wage cuts for wage earners and 24.3%
cuts for salary e a r n e r s ,… n d i n ga l s oas t r o n ge v i d e n c eo f8 %n o m i n a lw a g e
rigidity during 1971-88. Also, according to Card and Hyslop (1997), despite
many individuals in the PSID report wage cuts, there is clear evidence of
nominal wage rigidity. In particular, they …nd that the spike at zero hourly
wage changes spans from 7% in a 10% in‡ation environment to 15% when
in‡ation fell to 5%, both for salary and wage earners. Therefore, the spike
at zero nominal wage changes is highly sensitive to the rate of in‡ation.
Data at …rm level (Altonji and Devereux (1999)’s personnel …le of a large
…rm, Bewley (1998)’s interview study that involves 300 business people) show
much higher levels of wage rigidity, measured as hourly wage, and basically
no wage cuts. Using di¤erent methodologies, McLaughlin (1994), and Card
and Hyslop (1997) argue that measurement errors can not explain all the
percentages of wage cuts observed in individual survey’s data, whereas by
estimating an econometric model Altonji and Devereux (1999) explain all
the wage cuts observed in the PSID with measurement error. Therefore, in
the PSID, measurement errors apparently reduce the observed percentage of
nominal wage rigidity and increase the percentage of wage cuts.
Similar analyses carried out in some European countries seem to give
di¤erent results. Goux (1997) compares two di¤erent sources of data available
for France: the 1976-92 Dèclarations Annuelles de Donnèe Sociales (DADS),
an administrative, potentially error-free data-set, and the 1990-96 French
Labour Force Survey (LFS). Using annual earnings as a measure of wages,
and therefore not controlling for the number of hours, she …nds that the
amount of wage cuts is similar in the two data-sets and a¤ects approximately
325% of stayers employed full-time2.
Smith (1999) and Nickell and Quintini (2001) examine the UK using
di¤erent data sources. Smith (2000) analyses the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS). She uses weekly earnings as a measure for wages and stayers
who do not change the number of hours worked as the sample of interest.
She …nds that the percentage of employees whose wage is constant from one
year to the next is 9% during 1991-6 and the percentage of wage cuts is on
average 23%. Using the unique feature of the BHPS, that allows to consider
the subsample of people whose payslip has been checked by the interviewer,
Smith (1999) focuses on the employees whose reported earnings are error-
free, and who do not receive bonuses or overtime pay, …nding that only 1%
of them had zero pay growth and 18% received wage cuts. Therefore, contrary
to what has been found for the US, measurement errors seem to be able to
explain only the extent of wage rigidity, increasing the percentage of nominal
wage rigidity observed in survey data. As a consequence wages appear much
more ‡exible in the UK than in the US. Using the UK New Earnings Survey
(NES) from 1997 to 1999, Nickell and Quintini (2001) …nd on average lower
percentages of both no change in wage and wage cuts than Smith (2000) for
the same 1991-96 period, but they use a di¤erent measure of wage. In the
NES data are provided by employers and come directly from payroll records,
which ensures a high degree of accuracy. The measure of the nominal hourly
wage rate used is the weekly pay of those whose pay is una¤ected by absence,
excluding overtime pay, divided by weekly hours excluding overtime hours.
Again, only full-time employees are considered.
Fehr and Goette (1999) analyse earnings per working hour of stayers in
the Swiss LFS during the period of very low in‡ation 1991-96. They …nd
12% of rigid wages and 25% of wage cuts. Allowing for measurement errors
they estimate an econometric model obtaining results similar to those found
for the US: measurement errors can explain most of the observed wag cuts,
that actually turn in no wage changes.
As we can see, comparisons are not easy in this kind of analyses, as the
results highly depend on the quality of data used, the period considered, the
measure chosen for wages, and the methodology used in considering mea-
surement errors. In this paper we spoil the advantages of the ECHP data-set
2Interestingly, a good percentage of wage cuts can be explained with one of the follow-
ing: 1) better working conditions, 2) decrease in annual bonus, and 3) 4-digit change in
occupation.
4that allows us to give the same de…nition for stayers and movers and to use
the same measure of wage across the European countries that joined the
panel. Our purpose is to extend evidence on the extent of wage rigidity to
the European countries using a panel data from individual surveys which, for
its characteristics, can be easily compared to the PSID for the US and the
BHPS for the UK. At the same time, whereas in all previous studies only
non job changers were considered, we compare stayers and movers. In fact,
all the theories of nominal and real wage rigidity predict ‡exible wages for
movers.
We …nd evidence of nominal, and not real wage rigidity in all the countries
considered. But the extent of this rigidity is di¤erent across countries: it goes
from 42% in Germany to 2.03% in Ireland. At the same time, wage cuts are
common in the European countries. The percentages vary from 11.29% in
Portugal to 23.34% in Denmark. The striking result that we also …nd is
that movers wages appear to be quite rigid. This result rises concerns either
about the impact of measurement and rounding errors in survey-data or on
the predictive capabilities of the existing theories of wage determination.
The structure of the paper is the following: in Section 2 we describe
the ECHP data and the information available about employees and wages.
Section 3 contains the results of our analysis. In Section 4 we explain our
results using the implications of theories of wage determination. Section 5
summaries our conclusions.
2D a t a
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a recent large-scale
longitudinal study set up and funded by the European Union. The great
advantage of the ECHP is that it is a survey in which it is possible to …nd
information not only at household but also at individual level. Moreover,
the same questionnaire is asked to a sample of about 60,000 nationally rep-
resentative households - i.e. approximately 129,000 adults aged 16 years
and over - in 12 European countries (UK, Italy, France, Germany, Denmark,
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal).
This procedure allows us to compare directly data from di¤erent countries,
reducing the problems of harmonizing di¤erent countries information. Up
to now, only three waves are available, from 1994 to 1996. In 1995 Austria
joined the project and in 1996 Finland too, therefore the number of Member
5States raised to 14.
The user-friendly, anonymised version of the ECHP, sold by Eurostat, is
called User Data Base (UDB). In the UDB data have been anonymised and
checked as thoroughly as possible, and some imputations have been carried
out. This version of the data-set turns out to be very ’clean’, but it contains
less information than the original data, the so-called Production Data Base
(PDB).In this section, …rst we discuss how we constructed our sub-sample.
Then, in Section 2, we motivate our choice of the measure of wage.
2.1 Stayers and movers
As we said in the introduction, the purpose of our analysis is to study the im-
pact of renegotiating an existing contract on wage dynamics. For this reason
we concentrate on employees. Self-employed are excluded from our analysis
as their earnings are not regulated by a contract. Employees are detected
in the ECHP as people reporting wages. The crucial distinction is the one
between stayers, i.e. employees who do not change employer3 and movers,
i.e. employees who change employer, and so write a new employment con-
tract4Unfortunately we can not distinguish employees paid by the hour from
those paid weekly. But we have quite detailed information about the type
of the employment contract. In particular, we know whether the employee is
working part-time or full-time5. In Tab. 1 we give the composition of stayers
by contract characteristics. As we can see, full-time workers are the majority
in our sample. For this reason, our results do not change if we consider the
sub-sample of stayers full-time. In Appendix 2 we give the tables for all the
sample of stayers, and we compare part-time and full-time workers. In the
next Section we focus on stayers full-time.
3This can be easily done in the ECHP by constructing a ’job tenure’ variable from the
information available about the year and month of start of the current job. We classify as
stayers all the employees who do not change the date of start of the current job, obviously
with the respect to the date of the interview.
4In the ECHP we know the reason why movers moved, in particular we can distinguish
those who were …red from those who changed their job voluntarily.
5From 1995 on, we also know the type of contract (permanent, …xed-term or short-
term, casual with no contract, other working arrangements) and, for temporary contracts,
the length of the contract.
62.2 Measures of wage
Although in the original questionnaire both net and gross wages were asked,
in the UDB we …nd only information about net wages6. The only exception
is France where, because of the tax system, wage data have been collected
as gross.
In the ECHP hourly wages are not reported, but two measures of net
nominal earnings are available: 1) ”current net wage and salary earnings”
(i.e. earnings received in the month of the interview); and 2) ”total net wage
and salary earnings” (referred to the year before the interview). We decided
to take the …rst one as the most reliable measure of wages as the number of
months which the second is referred to is not reported.
Since the number of ”weekly hours worked in the main job” (always in
the month in which the interview was taken) are known, it is also possible
to calculate ”hourly current earnings”. The problem with this measure of
wages is that it adds up errors in reporting hours to the already existing errors
in reporting wages. Apparently, errors in hours are likely to be greater than
errors in pay7, therefore hourly wages, if not reported but calculated dividing
by the number of hours, can be a misleading measure of wage changes over
time. Moreover, since we are using earnings as a measure for wages, dividing
total earnings for the total number of hours is not appropriate, since usually
hourly base pay are di¤erent from overtime and bonus pay. In Appendix 1
we investigate the impact of the measure chosen for wages on our results.
One way of getting closer to a measure of the increase in basic wages,
adopted also in Smith (2000), is to study pay growth when there are no
hours changes8. In section 3, when presenting our results, we consider the
impact of a change in hours.
6Gross wages can be calculated using a net/gross ratio, estimated using a simple statis-
tical orcedure on the basis of reported ratios for income from current and previous year’s
employment, for both of which net as well as gross amounts are solicited. Althogh ”the
estimated net/gross ratios are a rather simplistic solution to a complex problem,...the
procedure appears robust in so far as the estimated conversion factors are found to have
ar a t h e rs m a l lv a r i a n c ewithin countries”. (Eurostat, ECHP UDB manual).
7For the similar PSID, Duncan and Hill (1985) and Bound et al. (1989) concluded that
large errors were introduced by dividing reported earnings by reported hours worked.
8Clearly in this case both total and hourly earnings changes coincide
7Tab. 1 Composition of stayers by contract characteristics
1994-95 1995-96
Countries Total FF PP FP PF Total FF PP FP PF
UK 1873 85.74 12.25 0.93 1.09 1927 86.61 11.57 0.93 0.88
Bel 1758 88.45 8.19 1.37 1.99 1758 89.53 8.64 1.03 0.80
Den 1701 91.12 6.94 0.82 1.12 1700 91.35 6.71 0.76 1.18
Fra 3819 89.11 5.76 1.31 3.82 3729 92.81 5.07 1.05 1.07
Germ 2973 88.36 9.12 1.11 1.41 2907 88.75 9.22 0.86 1.17
Gre 1570 89.55 1.46 0.76 8.22 1575 96.13 0.76 1.71 1.40
Ire 1501 88.27 5.53 1.00 5.20 1489 92.21 5.10 1.68 1.01
Ita 3603 88.09 2.64 0.44 8.83 3605 92.34 2.27 4.49 0.89
Lux 635 90.81 7.66 0.46 1.07 666 91.44 7.06 0.75 0.75
Neth 2646 83.30 13.87 1.17 1.66 2664 83.26 14.23 1.28 1.24
Port 2603 95.74 2.38 0.77 1.11 2576 96.51 2.41 0.35 0.74
Spa 2419 95.12 2.60 0.79 1.49 2448 96.00 2.33 0.74 0.94
Aust - - - - - 2143 90.01 6.81 1.77 1.40
FF=Full-time in both waves; PP=Part-time in both waves; FP=change contract from full-time to part-time;PF=change
contract from part-time to full-time
3 Results: a descriptive analysis
For each of the European countries considered we calculate the distributions
of one-year nominal wage changes. We approximate the percentage wage
change by taking the di¤erences in logs for each individual as follows:
logwt+1 ¡ logwt
We de…ne nominal wage rigidity as the percentage of observations such
that:
logwt+1 ¡ logwt =0
Taking the di¤erences in logs allows us to compare nominal with real
wage rigidity very easily. In fact, we can de…ne real wage rigidity as the













logwt+1 ¡ logpt+1 ¡ logwt +l o gpt =0
logwt+1 ¡ logwt =l o gpt+1 ¡ logpt
Therefore we can see the extent of real wage rigidity at the rate of in‡ation
(calculated as the di¤erence in logs of price levels in two consecutive years)
of the distribution of nominal wage changes.
In Fig.1a-2b we plot the histograms of the di¤erences in logs of nominal
current wages for stayers and movers. A vertical line has been inserted at
the annual rate of in‡ation9. The frequency of the histograms at zero gives
us the extent of nominal wage rigidity whereas the frequency at the rate of
in‡ation tells us the extent of real wage rigidity. In Fig 1a and 2a we analyze
stayers, whereas Fig.1b and 2b are referred to movers. We give the results
for both the time-periods considered: 1994-95 in Fig. 1a and 1b, and 1995-96
in Fig. 2a and 2b. For scale reasons, and in order to be able to see the centre
of the distribution clearly, a roughly equal fraction of workers of 5% at either
end of the distribution have been excluded10.
The histograms show that in all the European countries nominal wage
changes have a prominent spike at zero both for stayers and movers, but
(a part for France, Spain and Ireland) the fraction of employees in the bar
containing zero wage changes is always lower for movers than for stayers.
We also observe a sharp drop for little wage changes in stayers’ as well as
in movers’ distributions, with higher positive changes of wages more likely
to occur. Moreover, despite movers distributions look much more variable
than stayers’, there is clear evidence of some downward nominal wage rigidity
for both the categories of workers under examination as the distributions are
clearly asymmetric. At the same time, wages are not completely downwardly
rigid across the European countries: the percentages of wage cuts reported
are quite high. In none of the countries we observe a spike at the rate of
in‡ation: real wage cuts are much more frequent than nominal wage cuts.
The percentage of employees with no nominal wage change varies across
countries, and graphs in each …gure are presented in decreasing-spike order.
But it is important to notice that the bar showing the spike is constructed
around zero, therefore includes small positive and negative wage changes.
9The annual rate of in‡ation is calculated as the di¤erence in logs of the CPI, taken
from Eurostat’s publications.
10This has no qualitative consequences on our results.
9We discuss inter-countries di¤erences referring to …gures from Table 2, which
gives: in the …rst columns the number of stayers and movers in the sample
for each country, then the percentage of stayers and movers with exactly
zero nominal current net wage change, followed by the fraction of the same
categories of workers reporting wage cuts. We can see that for almost all the
countries the percentage of stayers with rigid wages is always higher than
the percentage of movers. A part from Luxembourg, for which we do not
have many observations, the countries with the highest percentages of no
wage changes are Germany and Belgium, followed by Italy. Portugal and
Denmark have a slightly smaller percentage of wage rigidity, followed by the
UK, Netherlands, Greece and France (but for France we have gross wages).
The countries with the most ‡exible wages are Spain and Ireland. We can
see that the results are not di¤erent in the two time-periods considered, a
part for the UK, Germany and Portugal, whose percentage of wage rigidity
decreases considerably in the second time-period.
In Table 2 we give also the unemployment rates in the two years of interest
for each country. We can notice that not always we have more rigid wages
in countries with higher unemployment. For example in Luxembourg, where
unemployment rates are very low, the percentage of people with rigid nominal
wages is very high; while in Spain, where unemployment rates are very high,
wages seem to be more ‡exible. Also, always from Tab. 2, the rates of
in‡ation are quite stable and low during the time-period considered, across
the European countries11.
Table 3 summarises the same numbers calculated in Tab 2, but only for
employees who do not change the number of working hours. As we can see,
the number of observations becomes much lower and, although the ranking of
our countries does not change with respect to Tab. 2, the extent of nominal
wage rigidity slightly increases whereas the percentage of wage cuts decreases
all over the countries. In general, a change in hours does not seem to have a
strong impact on our preferred measure of wages12.
11Changes in the growth rate can explain changes of my results from the …rst to the
secontime-period considered.
12See Appendix 1 for discussion of current hourly earnings dynamics.

















Ger 2627 166 42.98 37.35 17.40 26.51 0.0185 8.4 8.3
Bel 1555 78 36.66 29.49 16.14 17.95 0.0144 10.0 9.9
Lux 593 35 32.38 31.43 15.18 2.86 0.0193 3.2 2.9
Ita 3174 156 28.83 14.10 21.87 33.33 0.0505 11.4 11.8
Port 2492 129 19.30 13.18 12.76 18.60 0.0406 7.0 7.2
Den 1550 196 18.45 13.78 25.61 27.55 0.0204 8.2 6.8
UK 1575 185 15.05 8.11 21.84 25.95 0.0335 9.6 8.8
Neth 2204 200 14.02 8.50 19.65 28.50 0.0193 7.2 7.3
Gre 1406 96 12.73 9.38 14.01 23.96 0.0888 8.9 9.1
Fra 3403 144 10.40 10.42 33.47 34.72 0.0162 12.3 11.5
Sp 2301 201 4.00 11.44 19.82 32.34 0.0459 24.1 22.9
Ire 1325 152 2.42 2.63 23.32 23.03 0.0258 14.7 14.4
1995-1996










Bel 1565 71 30.73 26.76 21.02 25.35 .0197 9.7
Ita 3329 133 26.64 21.80 18.38 29.32 .0378 11.7
Ger 2580 182 26.28 17.03 25.93 28.02 .0142 8.9
Lux 609 26 21.84 11.54 19.54 26.92 .0134 3
Aust 1929 180 21.88 16.11 49.30 38.33 .0182 4.3
Den 1553 191 21.96 9.95 24.40 31.94 .0207 6.8
Neth 2218 151 16.82 11.92 22.14 31.79 .0206 6.3
Port 2486 141 12.43 10.64 9.94 29.08 .0306 7.3
Gre 1514 73 11.36 8.22 26.88 39.73 .0815 9.6
Fra 3461 110 9.39 6.36 32.42 40.91 .0205 12.4
UK 1669 208 5.39 5.29 21.63 31.73 .0238 8.2
Sp 2350 173 4.43 7.51 31.70 31.21 .0351 22.2
Ire 1373 143 2.40 2.10 28.84 26.57 .0163 11.7
11Tab. 3 CURRENT Nominal Wages of Stayers working full-time
and Movers who do not change the number of hours worked.
1994-1995
Countries St. FT Mov. %St. RW %Mov. RW %SFT Cuts %M Cuts
Ger 1053 40 42.36 47.50 16.14 20.00
Bel 674 19 37.09 31.58 16.62 21.05
Ita 1943 68 30.42 13.24 19.56 19.12
Lux 450 19 28.89 26.32 15.33 5.26
Port 1400 47 18.93 6.38 11.29 17.02
Den 981 74 17.64 13.51 23.34 28.38
UK 594 30 15.49 10.00 22.90 33.33
Gre 602 32 14.62 12.50 15.28 28.13
Neth 1275 71 13.96 8.45 18.27 29.58
Fra 1813 36 10.42 5.56 32.27 33.33
Spa 1086 72 4.60 9.72 19.24 31.94
Ire 541 37 2.03 2.70 22.55 13.51
1995-1996
Countries St. FT Mov. %St. RW %Mov. RW %SFT Cuts %M Cuts
Bel 668 12 31.14 16.67 20.51 25.00
Ger 1197 43 28.57 23.26 22.72 23.26
Ita 2017 51 27.96 27.45 16.16 21.57
Den 1093 87 23.06 10.34 22.96 36.78
Aust 933 55 21.97 9.09 49.30 36.36
Lux 501 12 19.96 - 19.96 41.67
Neth 1301 58 17.29 13.79 21.75 25.8
Port 1554 47 12.48 12.77 8.24 29.79
Gre 800 26 11.75 3.85 25.00 30.77
Fra 1944 28 10.03 7.14 33.44 25.00
Spa 1105 62 4.89 6.45 29.77 35.48
UK 676 31 4.59 - 18.34 19.35
Ire 639 36 1.88 - 27.54 30.56
12Comparisons with previous works
In general, we can say that wage dynamics from the ECHP have the same
features of the distributions constructed from similar panel data in the US.
On average the percentages of rigid wages and wage cuts in Europe are not
far away from those observed in the US for similar rates of in‡ation, but
there are enormous di¤erences across countries.
The numbers for the UK in the ECHP are di¤erent from Smith (2000)’s
results from the BHPS. For the same periods 1994-95 and 1995-96, Smith
(2000) …nds respectively 9.4% and 7.8% wages unchanged and 22.5% and
23.4% wage cuts. For the same time-period, Nickell and Quintini (2001) …nd
respectively 5.48% and 1.32% rigid wages and 19.47% and 18.20% nominal
hourly wage cuts. Wage dynamics for the UK from the ECHP are quite
strange: in Tab. 3 we observe a sharp drop both in the percentage of rigid
wage (from 15.49% to 4.59%) and in the frequency of wage cuts (from 22.90%
to 18.34%). Although we have to bear in mind that in the ECHP we observe
net wages whereas Smith (2000) analyses gross wages dynamics, we are not
aware of any particular institutional change in the UK in that period which
can explain such a strange result13. At the same time, if we look in Appendix
1, Tab.4, where the same numbers are given for current hourly earnings
dynamics, we notice that the percentages for rigid wages, 5.10% and 1.86%
are very close to the ones found by Nickell and Quintini (2001). The fact
that our wage cuts are higher, 33.02% and 27.80%, can be a consequence of
the fact that we can not eliminate the part of earnings related to overtime
hours and bonuses.
Comparisons with Goux (1997) for France can be done from Tab.2, where
we do not control for the number of hours. She considers gross earnings for
full-time workers in the LFS for the same period …nding respectively, in
1994-95 and 1995-96, 11.5% and 12% full-time workers whose earnings did
not change and 27% and 28% wage cuts. Our results for France give slightly
higher percentages of wage cuts (+3%) and lower percentages of rigid wages
(-2%).
13Note that in the UK in the second time-period there was a drop in the productivity
growth rate from 2.5% to 1.8%.
134E x p l a n a t i o n s
There are two important empirical results from the previous section that
deserve an explanation: 1) di¤erences of the spike at zero and the percentages
of wage cuts for stayers across countries, and 2) the spike at zero for movers.
4.1 Stayers
The ranking of the European countries that emerges from our …gures sug-
gests an explanation of di¤erences in wage changes across countries, taking
into account the characteristics of wage bargaining and labour market in-
stitutions. We regress the percentage of wage cuts for full time stayers on
country-variables such us: union coverage, coordination and employment pro-
tection legislation (epl). The results are shown in Tab. 4. The percentage
of coverage and epl and coordination are taken from various sources: OECD
publications, and Boeri - Brugiavini-Calmfors (2001). As we can see, both
coverage and epl are signi…cant. Coverage seems to be positively related to
wage cuts, one possible explanation can be that the higher is the coverage
the easier to adjust wages to negative shocks. Interestingly, the employment
protection legislation variable shows a negative sign, suggesting that wages








We tried to explain the striking spike observed at zero for movers looking at
various variable. The most useful were: 1) the number of hours worked, 2)
the reason why the employee changes job, and 3) satisfaction on the present
job, for a number of reasons.
14The estimates of the paramenters can be improved using panel data thechniques in
order to identify country-speci…c e¤ects, in future versions of the paper in which more
waves will be added.
14In all the countries we found that a quite high percentage of movers who
do not change their wage actually works a lower number of hours. Among
those who remain, about 60% did not change job voluntarily, but were ei-
ther …red or encouraged to move by their employer. Among the reasons for
accepting an equally rewarding job, satisfaction for the location of the new
job seems to play a clear role15.
Some of the explanations found for the spike at zero, such as the reason
for changing job, can be reconciled to the implications of micro-models of
wage determination. But clearly the amenities seem to be an interesting
variable to add to theoretical models.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated wage dynamics at individual level using data
from the ECHP survey. The particular feature of this new panel data set,
the fact that the same questionnaire is asked in all the countries involved in
the survey, allowed us to construct nominal wage changes distributions for
stayers full-time and movers, comparing twelve European countries. More-
over, the fact that the ECHP is in many features similar to the PSID survey,
allowed us to include in our comparisons also the US, where a number of
similar works have been carried out using individual surveys. Although in
all the countries considered we found a spike at zero nominal wage changes
for di¤erent measure of wages, wage cuts are frequent in all the European
countries. Therefore wages are not completely downwardly rigid. Moreover,
a high percentage of no wage change is observed both for stayers and movers.
We found interesting di¤erences across countries in the extent of the spike
at zero and the percentages of wage cuts. These di¤erences seem to re‡ect
di¤erences in institutional settings across the European countries, in par-
ticular coverage and employment protection legislation. Moving for reasons
depending on the employer, a reduction of the number of hours worked, and
amenities seem to explain instead the spike at zero observed for movers.
The wage dynamics observed are consistent with models that predict
nominal and not real wage rigidity. But it is hard to accept the hypothesis
that wages are downwardly rigid.
Although the approach so far has not taken into account reporting errors,
15Tables with results to be added...
15I am working in this directions for future drafts of the paper16. Studies on
administrative data on the same subject, to date not yet available for all the
countries considered in this paper, are clearly an important benchmark. But
usually administrative data lack the detailed information that we can …nd
in individual surveys. Moreover, it is not easy to compare the results for
di¤erent countries.
In conclusion, although the present work covers the analysis of nominal
wage rigidity using individual surveys, further work is needed in order to try
to understand the links between data of di¤erent quality in order to asses
the extent of wage rigidity in the European countries.
16Hopefully for July it should be ready.
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176 Appendix 1: Current and hourly earnings
In this Appendix we compare the measure of wage used in Section 3 to
t h es a m em e a s u r e ,d i v i d e db yt h en u m b e ro fh o u r s . A sw ec a ns e ef r o m
table 4, the results are completely di¤erent if we change the unit of measure.
In particular, hourly wage changes are less frequent than changes in current
earnings and the percentage of hourly wage cuts is higher than the percentage
of total earnings cuts. This result seems to indicate a general increase in the
number of hours reported from one year to the next. Anyway, since for people
who do not change the number of hours the two measures obviously coincide,
we can accept the results in Tab. 3 as a good measure for wage rigidity.
18Tab. 4 CURRENT HOURLY Nominal Wage changes of Stayers
working full-time and Movers, change number of hours worked




















Ger 2627 166 42.98 37.35 17.40 26.51 17.21 12.65 27.22 32.53
Bel 1555 78 36.66 29.49 16.14 17.95 16.21 6.41 31.06 25.64
Lux 593 35 32.38 31.43 15.18 2.86 22.09 17.14 18.89 28.57
Ita 3174 156 28.83 14.10 21.87 33.33 18.90 7.05 28.48 32.05
Port 2492 129 19.30 13.18 12.76 18.60 10.83 2.33 21.43 34.11
Den 1550 196 18.45 13.78 25.61 27.55 11.23 5.10 26.00 31.12
UK 1575 185 15.05 8.11 21.84 25.95 5.97 2.16 33.02 35.68
Neth 2204 200 14.02 8.50 19.65 28.50 8.12 3.50 27.40 33.00
Gre 1406 96 12.73 9.38 14.01 23.96 6.97 5.21 21.98 26.04
Fra 3403 144 10.40 10.42 33.47 34.72 5.58 1.39 37.11 40.28
Sp 2301 201 4.00 11.44 19.82 32.34 2.22 3.48 25.25 39.80
Ire 1325 152 2.42 2.63 23.32 23.03 0.91 1.32 27.55 25.66
1995-1996 CURRENT EARNINGS CURRENT HOURLY
EARNINGS
















Bel 1565 71 30.73 26.76 21.02 25.35 13.42 2.82 32.97 38.03
Ita 3329 133 26.64 21.80 18.38 29.32 17.36 12.03 25.92 27.07
Ger 2580 182 26.28 17.03 25.93 28.02 13.45 6.59 30.97 35.71
Lux 609 26 21.84 11.54 19.54 26.92 16.58 - 23.32 30.77
Aust 1929 180 21.88 16.11 49.30 38.33 10.89 3.33 55.78 43.33
Den 1553 191 21.96 9.95 24.40 31.94 16.23 4.71 28.72 35.60
Neth 2218 151 16.82 11.92 22.14 31.79 10.28 5.30 28.85 36.42
Port 2486 141 12.43 10.64 9.94 29.08 7.80 4.26 16.13 30.50
Gre 1514 73 11.36 8.22 26.88 39.73 6.47 1.37 30.25 43.84
Fra 3461 110 9.39 6.36 32.42 40.91 5.72 1.82 36.72 31.82
UK 1669 208 5.39 5.29 21.63 31.73 1.86 - 27.80 29.33
Sp 2350 173 4.43 7.51 31.70 31.21 2.47 2.31 34.43 38.73
Ire 1373 143 2.40 2.10 28.84 26.57 0.87 0.70 33.94 27.97
197 Appendix 2: Stayers
In this Appendix, …rst, in tables 5-6, we give current and hourly wage changes
for all non-job changers, without focussing, as in Section 3, on full-time work-
ers. As we can see, the results are not much di¤erent. This comes directly,
as we argued in Section 2, from the fact that stayers full-time represent the
majority of the sample, therefore they basically drive the result.
Then, in tables 7-8, we compare stayers working part-time and full-time.
As we can see, there is no clear pattern across the European countries. In
some countries earnings of people working full time are more rigid than part
times and in others the opposite is true.
20Tab.5 CURRENT Nominal Wage changes of Stayers
1994-1995 1995-1996
Countries Stayers %Rigid %C u t s Stayers % Rigid %C u t s
Ger 2973 43.90 17.49 2907 26.45 26.66
Bel 1758 36.52 16.15 1748 30.55 21.17
Lux 653 31.09 15.31 666 22.07 19.97
Aust - - - 2143 22.96 48.53
Ita 3603 29.53 22.26 3605 26.71 18.53
Port 2603 19.94 12.79 2576 13.00 9.90
Den 1701 18.93 26.22 1700 21.88 24.35
UK 1837 14.59 22.59 1927 5.55 22.16
Neth 2646 13.95 21.09 2664 16.82 22.97
Gre 1570 12.42 13.44 1575 11.56 27.30
Fra 3819 10.37 33.73 3729 9.36 32.61
Sp 2419 4.05 19.80 2448 4.62 31.66
Ire 1501 2.86 22.98 1489 2.82 29.01
Tab.6 CURRENT HOURLY Nominal Wage changes of Stayers
1994-1995 1995-1996
Countries Stayers %Rigid %C u t s Stayers % Rigid %C u t s
Ger 2973 18.37 27.75 2907 13.48 32.34
Bel 1758 15.87 31.63 1748 13.79 33.07
Lux 653 20.98 19.91 666 16.22 23.72
Aust - - - 2143 11.15 55.25
Ita 3603 18.54 30.61 3605 17.20 26.07
Port 2603 10.95 22.36 2576 8.23 16.46
Den 1701 11.23 27.34 1700 15.94 29.29
UK 1837 5.99 33.91 1927 2.18 27.92
Neth 2646 8.39 28.38 2664 10.44 30.18
Gre 1570 6.50 25.10 1575 6.29 30.79
Fra 3819 5.39 37.73 3729 5.63 36.90
Sp 2419 2.19 25.75 2448 2.53 34.80
Ire 1501 1.40 28.65 1489 1.21 34.05
21Tab. 7 CURRENT Nominal wage changes Stayers Full-time and
Part-time, change number of hours
1994-1995 FULL TIME PART TIME
Countries St. F % Rigid %C u t s St.P %R i g i d %Cuts
Ger 2627 42.98 17.40 271 49.08 19.19
Bel 1555 36.66 16.14 144 35.42 15.28
Lux 593 32.38 15.18 50 14.00 16.00
Ita 3174 28.83 21.87 95 33.68 17.89
Port 2492 19.30 12.76 62 37.10 12.90
Den 1550 18.45 25.61 118 24.58 32.20
UK 1575 15.05 21.84 225 12.44 27.11
Neth 2204 14.02 19.65 367 13.62 27.79
Gre 1406 12.73 14.01 23 13.04 13.04
Fra 3403 10.40 33.47 220 10.91 33.18
Sp 2301 4.00 19.82 63 3.17 15.87
Ire 1325 2.42 23.32 83 12.05 18.07
1995-1996 FULL TIME PART TIME
Countries St. F %Rigid %C u t s St.P % Rigid %C u t s
Bel 1565 30.73 21.02 151 31.79 22.52
Ita 3329 26.64 18.38 82 23.17 17.07
Ger 2580 26.28 25.93 268 30.22 35.45
Lux 609 21.84 19.54 47 21.28 23.40
Aust 1929 21.88 49.30 146 29.50 44.52
Den 1553 21.96 24.40 114 21.05 22.81
Neth 2218 16.82 22.14 379 17.68 27.18
Port 2486 12.43 9.94 62 41.94 8.06
Gre 1514 11.36 26.88 12 8.33 33.33
Fra 3461 9.39 32.42 189 10.05 32.28
UK 1669 5.39 21.63 223 7.17 21.52
Sp 2350 4.43 31.70 57 8.77 38.70
Ire 1373 2.40 28.84 76 10.53 31.58
22Tab. 8 CURRENT HOURLY Nominal Wage changes of Stayers
Full-time and Part-time, change number of hours worked
1994-1995 FULL TIME PART TIME
Countries St. F %R i g i d %C u t s St. P %R i g i d %C u t s
Ger 2627 17.21 27.22 271 33.58 28.04
Bel 1555 16.21 31.06 144 18.06 29.17
Lux 593 22.09 18.89 50 8.00 22.00
Ita 3174 18.90 28.48 95 22.11 29.47
Port 2492 10.83 21.43 62 20.97 33.87
Den 1550 11.23 26.00 118 13.56 37.29
UK 1575 5.97 33.02 225 6.67 40.00
Neth 2204 8.12 27.40 367 10.63 32.43
Gre 1406 6.97 21.98 23 4.35 39.13
Fra 3403 5.58 37.11 220 5.00 35.45
Sp 2301 2.22 25.25 63 1.59 22.22
Ire 1325 0.91 27.55 83 9.46 26.51
1995-1996 FULL TIME PART TIME
Countries St. F % Rigid %C u t s St. P % Rigid %C u t s
Bel 1565 13.42 32.97 151 20.53 30.46
Ita 3329 17.36 25.92 82 19.51 21.95
Ger 2580 13.45 30.97 268 16.42 41.42
Lux 609 16.58 23.32 47 14.89 23.40
Aust 1929 10.89 55.78 146 17.12 52.05
Den 1553 16.23 28.72 114 15.79 33.33
Neth 2218 10.28 28.85 379 12.66 33.51
Port 2486 7.80 16.13 62 29.03 16.13
Gre 1514 6.47 30.25 12 8.33 33.33
Fra 3461 5.72 36.72 189 6.35 34.92
UK 1669 1.86 27.80 223 4.93 26.91
Sp 2350 2.47 34.43 57 5.26 38.60
Ire 1373 0.87 33.94 76 7.89 36.84
238 Appendix 4: No change in the month of
the interview
It might be argued that considering a change in current earnings as the base-
measure for wage, the results presented in our paper can be biased by the
month in which the interview was taken. In this appendix, we replicate
all the tables that have been given in the paper for people whose interview
was taken in no more than two months di¤erence in the two years period
considered. As we can see, a part for the countries in which the number of
observations drops dramatically, the qualitative results do not change at all.
The percentages change but only slightly.
24Tab.# CURRENT Nominal Wage changes of Stayers
1994-1995 1995-1996
Countries Stayers %Rigid %C u t s Stayers % Rigid %C u t s
Ger 2973 43.90 17.49 2907 26.45 26.66
Bel 981 37.82 15.19 1348 30.42 19.96
Lux 37 45.95 8.11 500 20.00 18.20
Aust - - - 1749 21.38 49.00
Ita 2965 29.17 22.60 3266 26.76 18.62
Port 1901 21.46 11.73 1297 13.96 11.26
Den 1115 18.92 25.74 1497 21.04 24.52
UK 1812 14.51 22.74 1890 5.61 22.12
Neth 1981 13.88 21.66 110 17.27 17.27
Gre 1560 12.37 13.33 495 14.55 31.11
Fra 3458 10.03 33.83 3708 9.33 32.66
Sp 2222 3.78 19.62 2421 4.67 31.68
Ire 1251 3.04 22.14 1288 2.95 29.11
Tab.# CURRENT HOURLY Nominal Wage changes of Stayers
1994-1995 1995-1996
Countries Stayers %Rigid %C u t s Stayers % Rigid %C u t s
Ger 2973 18.37 27.75 2907 13.48 32.34
Bel 981 16.82 29.97 1348 13.13 32.86
Lux 37 27.03 13.51 500 14.00 22.20
Aust - - - 1749
Ita 2965 18.58 30.76 3266 17.21 26.09
Port 1901 11.68 23.20 1297 8.87 16.58
Den 1115 11.21 27.80 1497 15.23 29.79
UK 1812 6.02 33.94 1890 2.17 27.72
Neth 1981 8.73 29.23 110 10.00 28.18
Gre 1560 6.54 25.00 495 7.68 33.33
Fra 3458 5.15 37.68 3708 5.66 36.87
Sp 2222 2.03 25.65 2421 2.56 34.90
Ire 1251 1.52 28.22 1288 1.40 34.08
25Tab. # CURRENT Nominal Wage changes of Stayers Full-time.
1994-1995
change in month interview no change in m. interview
Countries St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts
Ger 2627 42.98 17.40 1053 42.36 16.14
Bel 1555 36.66 16.14 874 37.87 15.22
Lux 593 32.38 15.18 32 50.00 6.25
Ita 3174 28.83 21.87 1265 28.37 22.33
Port 2492 19.30 12.76 1816 20.93 11.73
Den 1550 18.45 25.61 1007 18.47 25.32
UK 1575 15.05 21.84 1551 14.96 21.99
Neth 2204 14.02 19.65 1657 13.82 19.92
Gre 1406 12.73 14.01 1396 12.68 13.90
Fra 3403 10.40 33.47 3081 10.16 33.56
Sp 2301 4.00 19.82 2120 3.73 19.67
Ire 1325 2.42 23.32 1112 2.61 22.48
1995-1996
change in month interview no change in m. interview
Countries St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts
Bel 1565 30.73 21.02 1208 30.55 20.03
Ita 3329 26.64 18.38 3019 26.70 18.52
Ger 2580 26.28 25.93 2580 26.28 25.93
Lux 609 21.84 19.54 454 18.94 18.50
Aust 1929 21.88 49.30 1572 20.48 49.62
Den 1553 21.96 24.40 1370 21.02 24.82
Neth 2218 16.82 22.14 94 17.02 19.15
Port 2486 12.43 9.94 1247 13.63 11.39
Gre 1514 11.36 26.88 472 13.98 30.51
Fra 3461 9.39 32.42 3442 9.36 32.48
UK 1669 5.39 21.63 1637 5.44 21.50
Sp 2350 4.43 31.70 2324 4.48 31.71
Ire 1373 2.40 28.84 1184 2.45 28.89
26Tab.# CURRENT Nominal Wages of Stayers Full time who do not change
the number of hours worked.
1994-1995
change in month interview no change in m. interview
Countries St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts
Ger 1053 42.36 16.14 1053 42.36 16.14
Bel 674 37.09 16.62 380 38.42 16.58
Ita 1943 30.42 19.56 1601 30.17 19.68
Lux 450 28.89 15.33 23 43.48 8.70
Port 1400 18.93 11.29 1007 20.85 10.53
Den 981 17.64 23.34 646 17.96 23.37
UK 594 15.49 22.90 586 15.53 23.04
Gre 602 14.62 15.28 599 14.69 15.19
Neth 1275 13.96 18.27 979 13.89 19.31
Fra 1813 10.42 32.27 1632 9.99 32.54
Spa 1086 4.60 19.24 1000 4.20 19.30
Ire 541 2.03 22.55 465 2.37 21.94
1995-1996
change in month interview no change in m. interview
Countries St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts
Bel 668 31.14 20.51 504 30.16 20.04
Ger 1197 28.57 22.72 1197 28.57 22.72
Ita 2017 27.96 16.16 1822 28.21 16.14
Den 1093 23.06 22.96 1370 21.02 24.82
Aust 933 21.97 49.30 743 19.52 50.20
Lux 501 19.96 19.96 369 16.80 18.97
Neth 1301 17.29 21.75 51 15.69 19.61
Port 1554 12.48 8.24 747 14.32 8.97
Gre 800 11.75 25.00 250 14.40 29.20
Fra 1944 10.03 33.44 1936 10.07 33.37
Spa 1105 4.89 29.77 1094 4.94 29.80
UK 676 4.59 18.34 660 4.55 17.88
Ire 639 1.88 27.54 556 2.16 27.70
27Tab. # CURRENT HOURLY Nominal Earnings changes of Stayers,
change number of hours worked
1994-1995
change in month interview no change in m. interview
Countries St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts
Ger 2627 17.21 27.22 2627 17.21 27.22
Bel 1555 16.21 31.06 874 16.82 29.75
Lux 593 22.09 18.89 32 31.25 9.38
Ita 3174 18.90 28.48 2615 18.78 28.45
Port 2492 10.83 21.43 1816 11.73 22.25
Den 1550 11.23 26.00 1007 11.52 26.02
UK 1575 5.97 33.02 1551 6.00 33.08
Neth 2204 8.12 27.40 1657 8.27 27.82
Gre 1406 6.97 21.98 1396 7.02 21.85
Fra 3403 5.58 37.11 3081 5.32 37.13
Sp 2301 2.22 25.25 2120 2.03 25.14
Ire 1325 0.91 27.55 1112 0.99 26.98
1995-1996
change in month interview no change in m. interview
Countries St. %St. RW %SFT Cuts St. FT %St. RW %SFT Cuts
Bel 1565 13.42 32.97 1208 12.67 32.78
Ita 3329 17.36 25.92 3019 17.46 25.84
Ger 2580 13.45 30.97 2580 13.45 30.97
Lux 609 16.58 23.32 454 13.88 22.03
Aust 1929 10.89 55.78 1572 9.54 56.36
Den 1553 16.23 28.72 1370 15.40 29.34
Neth 2218 10.28 28.85 94 8.51 30.85
Port 2486 7.80 16.13 1247 8.58 16.12
Gre 1514 6.47 30.25 472 8.05 33.05
Fra 3461 5.72 36.72 3442 5.75 36.69
UK 1669 1.86 27.80 1637 1.83 27.49
Sp 2350 2.47 34.43 2324 2.50 34.51
Ire 1373 0.87 33.94 1184 1.01 33.87
28Composition of STAYERS(change month of the interview)
1994-95 1995-96
Countries FF PP FP PF FF PP FP PF
UK 85.74 12.25 0.93 1.09 86.61 11.57 0.93 0.88
Bel 88.45 8.19 1.37 1.99 89.53 8.64 1.03 0.80
Den 91.12 6.94 0.82 1.12 91.35 6.71 0.76 1.18
Fra 89.11 5.76 1.31 3.82 92.81 5.07 1.05 1.07
Germ 88.36 9.12 1.11 1.41 88.75 9.22 0.86 1.17
Gre 89.55 1.46 0.76 8.22 96.13 0.76 1.71 1.40
Ire 88.27 5.53 1.00 5.20 92.21 5.10 1.68 1.01
Ita 88.09 2.64 0.44 8.83 92.34 2.27 4.49 0.89
Lux 90.81 7.66 0.46 1.07 91.44 7.06 0.75 0.75
Neth 83.30 13.87 1.17 1.66 83.26 14.23 1.28 1.24
Port 95.74 2.38 0.77 1.11 96.51 2.41 0.35 0.74
Sp 95.12 2.60 0.79 1.49 96.00 2.33 0.74 0.94
Aust - - - - 90.01 6.81 1.77 1.40
FF= Full-time in both years; PP= Part time in both years; FP= changing
contract from full-time to part-time;PF=changing contract from part-time to
full-time.
STAYERS(no change month of the interview)
1994-95 1995-96
Countries FF PP FP PF FF PP FP PF
UK 85.60 12.36 0.94 1.10 86.61 11.64 0.90 0.85
Bel 89.90 8.66 0.82 1.43 89.61 8.68 0.82 0.89
Den 90.31 7.53 0.54 1.61 91.52 6.55 0.73 1.20
Fra 89.10 5.73 1.24 3.93 92.32 4.95 1.65 1.07
Germ 88.36 9.12 1.11 1.41 88.75 9.22 0.86 1.17
Gre 89.49 1.47 0.77 8.27 95.35 0.40 3.03 1.21
Ire 88.89 5.20 0.88 5.04 91.93 5.28 1.79 1.01
Ita 88.20 2.26 0.40 9.14 92.44 2.14 4.53 0.89
Lux 86.49 10.81 - 2.70 90.80 7.40 0.80 1.00
Neth 83.64 13.48 1.06 1.82 85.45 12.73 - 1.82
Port 95.53 2.79 0.63 1.05 96.14 2.31 0.46 1.08
Sp 95.41 2.61 0.68 1.31 95.99 2.31 0.74 0.95
Aust - - - - 89.88 6.86 1.72 1.54
29YEARLY NOMINAL WAGE CHANGES
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